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INTRODUCTION
The boom-and-bust real estate market has been a gold mine at
times and a minefield at others. The specter of the 1980s, when
cavalier lending fueled wild speculation on dubious real estate
ventures, still lingers in many investors' minds. As we move through
the 1990s, however, many experts feel that real estate is once again on
the rise. And, as seems to be true of investing generally, real estate
2assets are increasingly being held by large conglomerates. One
vehicle being used with greater frequency by real estate investors is
the Real Estate Investment Trust, or "REIT."3 REITs are a creation of
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' See, e.g., Jerry Edgerton, Earn Up to 28% in RErTs, MoNEY, Nov. 1996, at 104 ("If
you're leery of investing in bricks and mortar because you were burned in the real
estate crash of the mid- to late-1980s, rest assured that times have changed."); Vanessa
O'Connell, REITs Grow Popular as Way to Diversify, but It Can Be Hard to Pick the Right
Ones, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1996, at CI ("Real estate is rebounding, as rents and
occupancy rates continue to inch higher.").
2 See, e.g., Ben W. Johnson, The Great REIT Compete; NAT'L REAL EST. INv., July 1,
1996, available in 1996 WL 9371937 ("The bottom line is that REITs in recent years
have been instrumental in the increasing institutionalization of the commercial real
estate markets ... .");Joelle Tessler, RFJTs Use Offerings for Buying Spre WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 29, 1996, at A3 ("'What we're seeing is a wholesale consolidation of private real
estate assets into the public sector .... .'" (quoting Paine Webber Inc. analystJonathan
Litt)).
3 See, e.g., Frank Byrt, Study Projects RElTs' Growth Through 2000, WALL ST. J., June 6,
1997, at A9 (noting that in 1996, REIT stocks recorded a 36.4% return compared with
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the Internal Revenue Code that allow investors to pool real estate
4holdings, resulting in beneficial tax consequences.
REITs, however, are not only growing from the contribution of
real estate by property owners. Increasingly, they are looking toward
the capital equity markets to finance acquisitions. This influx of
capital has helped REITs prosper as they look for further acquisition
and merger opportunities. The funds from these equity offerings also
bring a new type of investor into the REIT equation: the common
stockholder. The addition of common stockholders to a REIT's
organizational structure can cause conflicts between the property
owners, who contributed their real estate to the REIT to enjoy the
effects of diversification and beneficial tax consequences, and the
common shareholders in the REIT, who are concerned with
dividends and the appreciation of the stock.
Because both REITs and UPREITs, 6 the latest and most popular
incarnation of the REIT, are relatively modem inventions, the legal
issues they present, particularly in scenarios where UPREITs are
merging with or acquiring other UPREITs, are new and untested. In
the few instances in which courts have addressed issues involving
REITs, they have analyzed the REIT as they would any other
corporate entity-usually deferring to the business judgment of the
a 23% return by the S&P 500); Kathleen Morris & Richard A. Melcher, REIT Are Going
Like a House Afire, BUS. WK.,June 2, 1997, at 122 (noting that REITs outperformed the
S&P 500 by a 29% to 25% margin during the year prior to June 1997); see also George
Covucci & Andrew Pace, Umbrella Partnership Real Estate Investment Trusts Can Facilitate
Property Acquisition, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1996, at B10 ("[T]he growth and expansion of
REITs... likely will have a major impact in the real estate market in the late 1990s and
beyond.").
The portions of the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to REITs are contained in
I.R.C. §§ 856-860 (1994).
5 See, e.g., Stephanie Fitch, Big-City Office Landlords to Boost Stock Offers Through REITs
Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1997, at B7 (noting that planned 1997 IPOs of big-city
office property REITs are expected to total more than $5 billion, compared to $1.2
billion in IPOs for real estate companies of all kinds in 1996); Patrick McGeehan, REIT
Issuance Surges on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1997, at C17 (noting that proceeds
from REIT offerings as of October 1997 were $12 billion, more than twice the level as
of October 1996).
6 "UPREITs" (Umbrella Partnership Real Estate Investment Trusts) are a
derivation of the basic REIT structure. They are essentially a combination of a REIT
and a partnership. The joining of these two entities allows investors and property
contributors not only to enjoy the advantages the basic REIT structure offers, but also
to realize additional tax advantages not found in the basic REIT structure. Because of
these added benefits, most REITs are now grouped with related partnerships and are
organized as UPREITs. For further discussion, see infra Part I.
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REIT's officers and directors. Though such deference may be
appropriate in some situations concerning UPREITs, the UPREIT
structure presents many inherent conflicts between shareholders and
fiduciaries that a regular corporation does not. Because an UPREIT
is more likely to generate conflicts of interest for fiduciaries," a
reviewing court's decision to automatically defer to the business
judgment of the fiduciaries becomes more suspect.'
This Comment explains why courts should not treat UPREITs as
they would treat any other corporate entity. This conclusion is based
on the inherent conflicts between individuals who became share-
holders by contributing property to the UPREIT and those who
became shareholders through the stock market. Before granting an
UPREIT the type of deference that is usually given to the business
judgment of a corporation's board and officers, courts must under-
stand the reasons why the UPREIT structure makes conflicts of
interest so much more likely than in a normal corporation. In
litigation concerning UPREITs, courts should be wary of these
Cf Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del.
1993) ("Under normal circumstances, neither the courts nor the stockholders would
interfere with the managerial decisions of the directors. The business judgment rule
embodies the deference to which such decisions are entitled."); Michael W. Schwartz
et al., Mergers and Acquisitions: Recent Developments in Takeover Tactics and Defense, in 1
NEW DIMENSIONS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES 443, 451
(1992) ("The recent decisions in Delaware... emphasizing the application of the
business judgment rule to acquisition activity... have all contributed to the changes
evidenced in the current takeover environment.").
Courts apply business judgment deference as readily to REITs as to other
corporate entities. See, e.g., Realty Acquisition Corp. v. Property Trust of Am., No. CIV.
JH-89-2503, 1989 WL 214477, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 1989) (applying business
judgment deference to the decision of a REIT board not to waive a percentage equity
ownership limitation). For further discussion, see infra note 169 and accompanying
text.
a REITs are normally corporations that fulfill certain requirements of the Tax
Code, allowing them to acquire REIT status. See infra Part I.A. Since UPREITs are a
combination of a REIT and a partnership, they contain two categories of interested
parties-the common stockholders in the REIT and the partners in the related
partnership. Because of certain tax advantages that are available to the partners and
not to the common stockholders, these two types of parties may have different goals
with regard to the business decisions of the UPREIT. These conflicts are exacerbated
by the fact that the partners, who also generally either sit on the REIT board or own
substantial equity in the REIT, owe a fiduciary duty to the common stockholders. See
discussion infra Part II.C-E.
9 The fact that these conflicts of interest'are inherent in the UPREIT structure
supports the proposition that reviewing courts should closely examine the business
decisions of a REIT board or fiduciary, especially when the litigation involves a dispute
between REIT common stockholders and the fiduciaries that are supposed to
represent the best interests of those stockholders. See discussion infra Part IV.
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inherent conflicts and their effect on the decisions of UPREIT fiduci-
aries. This increased scrutiny is more likely to result in a heightened
standard of review than that which is usually given to the decisions of
corporations under the business judgment rule. Understanding the
complexity of the UPREIT structure is an ambitious task, but it is one
that should be undertaken to ensure that courts are protecting the
interests of the REIT's common shareholders.
The purpose of this Comment is twofold: first, to show why the
decisions of UPREIT fiduciaries merit greater judicial scrutiny than
that which is usually given to corporate fiduciaries; and second, to
show how this more rigorous scrutiny is consistent with the current
majority doctrinal approach to breach of fiduciary duty claims. Part I
of this Comment will briefly describe the structure and mechanics of a
basic REIT, as well as the advantages a REIT entity has over a partner-
ship or corporate organization. Part II will analyze why investors are
almost exclusively switching to UPREITs, which are a derivation of the
basic REIT, and will focus both on the advantages the UPREIT
structure offers and on the types of conflicts the structure engenders
among investors in the UPREIT. Part III will discuss the different
standards of review a court may apply when dealing with corporate
litigation, including business judgment, entire fairness, and
Schnell/Blasius review. Parts IV and V will describe why the application
of the business judgment rule to UPREITs is difficult, especially in the
context of a merger or acquisition scenario, and how courts should
analyze an UPREIT involved in breach of fiduciary duty litigation.
This Comment will not postulate a new doctrinal approach or
standard of review for a court faced with litigation involving UPREITs;
rather, it will show how the greater judicial scrutiny merited by the
UPREIT structure can be fit within the current doctrinal framework.
I. REITs GENERALLY
Real Estate Investment Trusts are investment vehicles that allow
investors to pool real estate assets with beneficial tax consequences.10
10 See RobertJ. Haft & Peter M. Fass, Real Estate Investment Trusts: An Alternative to
the Real Estate Limited Partnership, in 4C TAx-ADVANTAGED SECURnTIEs: ILPS, PASS-
THROUGHS, AND OTHERVEHICLES § 16.01, at 16-4 to -5 (1996) ("Real estate investment
trusts (REITs) are financial vehicles that allow investors to pool funds for participation
in real estate ownership or financing.... REMrs that operate in compliance with
special tax laws . . . pay no federal tax on income or gains passed on to their
shareholders."); Gary J. Purpura & Kevin E. Adler, Allocating UPREIT Income to Prevent
RETDisqualification, 13J. PARTNERSHIP TAx'N 82, 82 ("A REIT is a passive investment
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In 1960, Congress created RETs as a means of encouraging small
investors to participate in the type of real estate investments that were
traditionally available only to institutions or wealthy individuals."
Organizations that operate as REITs do not have to pay federal tax on
income or gains and can opt to pass their income through to share-
holders. 2 REIT investors also enjoy the advantages of limited liability
and transferability of shares (i.e., liquidity) that a corporate structure
offers, without incurring the costs of double taxation. 3 Thus, a REIT
is essentially a combination of a corporation and a partnership in that
it combines the benefits of a corporation with the pass-through nature
of a partnership.
A. Basic REIT Structure
A REIT is defined as any corporation, trust, or association that
meets the requirements of § 856 of the Internal Revenue Code.'
4
REIT ownership is shared by two different types of parties. The
distinction between these parties is a function of the type of capital
each party contributes to the REIT. Those who contribute real estate
in exchange for equity are generally called "sponsors" of the REIT.
Those who purchase shares in the REIT with cash are called
"investors."'
5
vehicle organized to pool the capital of a large number of investors to invest in real
estate.... Unlike an ordinary corporation, however, a REIT is entitled to deduct
dividends paid to its shareholders [which] ... effectively eliminates the corporate level
tax on income earned by the REIT.").
" See S. REP. No. 85-1983 (1958), available in 1958 WL 3687 (Leg. Hist.), at *161
("[T]he methods of investment [in REITs] constitute pooling arrangements whereby
small investors can secure advantages normally available only to those with larger
resources."); see also Haft & Fass, supra note 10, § 16.01 (providing a brief history of why
RETs were created by Congress).
12 See I.RLC. § 857(a)(1) (1994); see also Haft & Fass, supra note 10, at § 16.01
("REITs that operate in compliance with special tax laws (called 'qualified' REITs) pay
no federal tax on income or gains passed on to their shareholders. This so-called
conduit or pass-through feature is the foremost benefit that shareholders enjoy as a
result of investing in REITs.").
,S See Purpura & Adler, supra note 10, at 83 ("Generally organized as corporations,
RETs provide investors with the usual advantages of corporate ownership, including
limited liability and freely transferable shares. Unlike an ordinary corporation,
however, a REIT is entitled to deduct dividends paid to its shareholders.").
I.R.C. § 856.
,2 The distinction between sponsors and investors is not crucial in teims of a basic
REIT structure because each group receives the same types of benefits. In a basic
REIT, both parties receive dividends from the REIT, and both parties receive the
diversification and bargaining power advantages that a REIT offers over private real
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Section 856 of the Tax Code includes four types of requirements
that a business must meet to qualify as a REIT: organizational
requirements, distributional requirements, income tests, and asset
tests. 16 The overall purpose of these tests is to ensure that the REIToperates primarily as a passive real estate investment vehicle. 7
1. Organizational Requirements
Section 856 of the Internal Revenue Code includes six different
organizational requirements that a REIT must satisfy. First, the REIT
must be managed by one or more trustees or directors for the entire
taxable year.'8  Second, beneficial ownership of the REIT must be
evidenced by transferable shares.' 9 Third, the entity must be one that,
but for the REIT election, would be taxable as a domestic corporation
or trust.2 Fourth, the entity can be neither a financial institution, as
estate holdings. See discussion infra Part I.B. In an UPREIT structure, sponsors receive
benefits different from those received by the investors. Thus, the distinction between
.sponsors" and "investors" is vital when discussing the UPREIT structure. See
discussion infra Part II.A.
I.R.C. § 856.
" See Haft & Fass, supra note 10, § 16.05, at 16-56.34 ("The overall goal of the REIT
provisions of the Code is to set up a passive real estate investment vehicle. To this end,
the Code prescribes .... tests [that] ensure [the] strict passivity of a REIT-i.e., that it
does not actively engage in a trade or business.").
The justification for requiring the nature of REIT income to be passive lies in the
nature of the REIT and its legislative origins. REITs are hybrid entities. They are
conduits in that their income is passed through the entity to shareholders. See I.R.C. §
857(a) (1) (1994) (allowing REITs to deduct dividends paid to shareholders). Yet they
are allowed to operate as corporations, see id. § 856(a) (3), thus availing themselves of
the advantages of the corporate form. Congress recognized this and enacted income
requirements for REITs that seek to ensure the entity is not being actively managed by
shareholders that organize as a REIT simply to escape double taxation. See, e.g., id. §
856(c) (2)-(5) (describing various income requirements for RETs). These concerns
are reflected in requiring REIT income to be essentially "passive"-the inference
being that the property contributors are not actively managing a trade or business, but
are simply pooling their real estate assets with the assets of other owners. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 99-841 (1986), available in 1986 WL 31988 (Leg. Hist.), at *520
("Certain requirements are imposed on ... REITs ... that are intended to prevent
[them] from engaging in the active conduct of a trade or business."); S. REP. No. 94-
938(I) (1976), available in 1976 WL 13862 (Leg. Hist), at *1045-46 ("These tests are
intended to allow the special tax treatment for a REIT only if there really is a pooling
of investment arrangement which is evidenced by its organizational structure.., and if
its income is clearly passive.., as contrasted with income from the operation of a
business involving real estate.").
18 SeeI.RLC. § 856(a)(1).
See id § 856(a) (2).
See id. § 856(a) (3).
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defined in § 582(c) (5) of the Code, nor an insurance company
pursuant to Subchapter L of the Code." Fifth, beneficial ownership
of a REIT must be held by 100 or more persons.2 Sixth, during the
last half of each taxable year, not more than fifty percent of a REIT's
outstanding stock can be held by five or fewer persons, pursuant to
the personal-holding company provisions in § 542.23
These organizational requirements reflect the general policy
initiative behind the creation of the REIT structure-giving small
investors the opportunity to invest in real estate. The most prominent
of these requirements (and the most troubling for REIT organizers)
are the five person/fifty percent requirement and the 100 person
beneficial ownership requirement.24 By setting up rigid quantitative
ownership requirements, these rules address the concern that REIT
ownership will be concentrated in the hands of wealthy individual real
estate investors.
2. Income Tests
After meeting the six basic organizational requirements, a REIT
must satisfy three different income tests. These tests are
"complicated, mechanical tests which are intended to limit the
investments of a REIT to real estate and certain other types of passive
investments. "25 Thus, by limiting the types of investments with which
a REIT can involve itself, these tests limit a REIT's earnings to income
2, See id. § 856(a) (4). Financial institutions, which cannot qualify as REITs, include
banks, chartered savings institutions, and small business investment companies. See id.
§ 852(c) (2)-(5).
See id. § 856(a) (5).
See id. § 856(a) (6) (incorporating §§ 856(h) and 542).
24 See William B. King, Factors That Influence the Organization and Governance of
Today's REIT, inREITS 1994: WHATYOU NEEDTO KNOW Now 77, 82 (1994) ("The not-
closely-held requirement... (sometimes also referred to as the '5 or fewer' or '5-50'
rule) requires close attention. Virtually all REIT charters have 'Excess Share'
provisions designed to provide mathematical certainty that 5 shareholders may not
own more than 50% of the value of the outstanding shares of the REIT." (citation
omitted)).
Richard M. Lipton, RETs and UPRElTs: The New Game in Real Estat4 in 2
CREATIVE TAX PLANNING FOR REAL ESTATE TRANsACTIONs 829, 837 (ALI-ABA Comm.
on Continuing Prof'l Educ. ed., 1994) (describing how REITs operate under the
Internal Revenue Code).
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that is both passive and derived from transactions that are closely
connected with real estate activities.
26
3. Assets Tests
A REIT must also meet several requirements based on the nature
of the assets it holds. These requirements ensure that a REIT's asset
holdings are primarily comprised of real property or assets related to
real property ownership. At least seventy-five percent of the value of a
REIT's assets must be represented by real estate assets, cash and cash
items (for example, receivables), and government securities.27 In
addition, not more than twenty-five percent of a REIT's total assets
may be comprised of securities, not more than five percent may be
the securities of a single issuer, and the REIT cannot own more than
ten percent of the outstanding voting securities of a single non-REIT
issuer. 8
4. Distribution Requirements
Section 857 of the Code sets out a number of requirements which
dictate the manner in which a REIT is to distribute income to its
shareholdersY. The basic purpose of these requirements is to ensure
that a REIT operates as a pass-through entity. The major distribution
requirement is that at least ninety-five percent of the REIT's annual
income must be distributed to shareholders as dividends.30 If the
REIT meets these requirements, it is allowed to deduct the amount of
dividends paid.3 ' This dividend deduction allows a REIT to avoid
double taxation and is the primary difference between a REIT and a
normal corporate entity.3 2 The requirements also ensure REIT share-
See Haft & Fass, supra note 10, § 16.05, at 16-56.34 (noting that the income tests
in the Tax Code are structured so as to ensure the passivity of a REIT and its focus on
real estate).
2 See I.R.C. § 856(c) (5) (A).
28 See id. § 856(c) (5) (B).
29 See id.§ 857.
" See id. § 857(a)(1).
31 See id.
52 SeeJulius Westheimer, RETs Feature Growth, Stability, and High Income, BALT. SUN,
Nov. 27, 1996, at 8C ("To avoid being taxed at the corporate level, 95 percent of
REITs' earnings must be paid out to stockholders.").
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holders of a steady stream of dividends, assuming the REIT has a
positive cash flow."
B. Advantages of REITs over Other Investment Vehicles
The fact that REITs hold pools of real estate assets offers sponsors
and investors several significant advantages over other real estate
investment vehicles. First, there are the diversification advantages
that a large pooling of different assets offers. Sponsors and investors,
because they invest different types of capital in the REIT, realize this
benefit in different ways. By investing in a REIT, a sponsor mitigates
the level of risk associated with the property she contributed.
Through the REIT, she becomes a shareholder in an entity that owns
different types of real estate assets.34 Sponsors also avail themselves of
the opportunity to eliminate the personal liabilities that encumber
their contributed property by having the REIT assume these
liabilities.35 Investors do not realize any benefit vis-i-vis their personal
assets (as sponsors do), but they are given the opportunity to invest in
assets that have historically been the domain of only wealthy,
property-owning individuals.3
A second advantage of REITs is that, by pooling different real
estate holdings, a REIT has more bargaining power than an individual
real estate owner would have when negotiating items such as loans
and service costs.s7 The capital accumulation that REITs provide can
be utilized to get better interest rates on mortgages and other
See Edgerton, supra note 1, at 105 ("[1]nvestors can expect dividends to keep
increasing if a REIT's cash flow is growing."); Westheimer, supra note 32, at 8C
("[B]ecause REITs must distribute [their] profits, they pay high yields of 6 percent to
10 percent or more.").
3' See Tessler, supra note 2, at A3 (stating that REITs are expanding and
diversifying their property bases in order to avoid risks resulting from a limited
geographic concentration).
See Robert J. Crnkovich, UPREITs: The Use of Partnerships in Structuring and
Operating Real Estate Investment Trusts, in REITs 1993: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW NOW
63, 65 (1993) (discussing sponsors' ability to avoid personal liability for outstanding
real estate debts).
See Vanessa O'Connell, A Hot Property: Popular REITs Put Investors in Real Estate
Game, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1996, at C1 ("For small investors, REITs offer a broader
exposure to real estate markets than most investors otherwise could attain.");
Westheimer, supra note 32, at 8C ("RELTs allow you to invest alongside real estate's big
names." (quoting Martin Cohen, president of a large New York RErr)).
37 See Tessler, supra note 2, at A3 ("REITs... have more bargaining power when
negotiating prices for such things asjanitorial services.").
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financing activities. Similarly, REITs provide significant economies of
scale in the management and administration of various properties.3
A third advantage of REITs is their attractive investment returns
for both investors and sponsors. REITs offer relatively constant rates
of return and, thus, protection against the volatility of the stock
market.3 9 REITs generally have a low correlation with the stock
market and they have historically performed better than stocks during
market downturns. 4 They generally offer higher yields than other
"conservative" investments such as CDs and money market funds 1
and, because of the distribution requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code, REIT shareholders are assured dividends, even if the
share price of the REIT drops.
C. Increasing Merger Activity for RFTs
REITs first gained widespread popularity from tax law changes
made in the 1986 Tax Reform Act.42 In the Act, Congress eliminated
accelerated depreciation for most real property and adopted passive
loss provisions.4 3 These changes eliminated many of the tax advan-
' See id. ("[R]eal estate companies are able to achieve significant economies of
scale in their management and administration operations by becoming larger.").
'9 See O'Connell, supra note 36, at Cl ("Real-estate investment trusts... can be a
smart choice for stock and bond investors aiming for smoother overall returns.").
40 See Edgerton, supra note 1, at 104 ("REITs are attractive bets right now because
they've historically lost less than other stocks-or even managed to gain value-during
market downturns."); O'Connell, supra note 36, at C1 ("REITs have a low correlation
with the stock market, especially over periods of longer than 10 trading days.").
"1 See Crnkovich, supra note 35, at 65 (asserting that investors are attracted to
REITs because of their steady income flow). Although REITs are generally thought to
be a safe investment, they do not necessarily underperform the stock market. In 1996,
REIT stocks outperformed the S&P 500 by over a 13% margin, 36.4% to 23%. See Byrt,
supra note 3, at A9 (comparing the performance of REITs to equity markets); see also
Ed McCarthy, RE1Ts: Is It Time for Another Look?, PENSION MGMT., Feb. 1, 1996, at 14
("For the five-year period ending Oct. 31, 1995, equity REITs averaged an annual total
return of 17.29%, matching the S&P 500's 17.23% for the same period.").
42 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201,100 Stat. 2121, 2121 (1986).
4s The passive loss provisions enacted in the 1986 Tax Act restrict the ability of
investors to deduct losses from certain types of activities. See I.R.C. § 469 (1994);
MICHAELJ. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 418 (3d ed. 1995) ("This section was intended primarily to preclude
taxpayers from using losses derived from tax shelter investments to reduce taxes on
earned income and on investment income such as interest and dividends.").
Prior to the enactment of the passive loss provisions, real estate investors could
utilize the limited partnership structure to invest in real estate ventures and deduct
losses that were passed through. This made limited partnerships more popular than
REITs because REITs cannot pass through losses to shareholders. See McCarthy, supra
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tages held by limited liability partnerships and private real estate
holdings, the proliferation of which had fueled the wild speculation
in real estate markets during the early 1980s.44
Since 1986, REITs have grown steadily, performing well against
the stock market,45 and, as a result, raising impressive amounts of
capital in the initial and secondary public offering markets. 46  As
REITs continue to prosper, industry experts expect merger activity to
greatly increase among REITs. This forecast is based largely on the
success of REITs in the public offering markets and the interest of
large institutional investors. These factors have provided a large
influx of capital that can be used to fund merger activity. 4 Also, the
REIT industry is becoming increasingly standardized and mature.49
note 41, at 15 ("You could pass losses through to investors with a limited partnership.
You can't do that with a REIT. So everyone invested in real estate through limited
partnerships."). Section 469 of the Tax Code greatly restricts this type of activity and,
as a result, REITs have gained popularity with investors. See infra text accompanying
note 44.
" See Lipton, supra note 25, at 832 ("The changes in the tax law in 1986,
particularly the passive loss rules, have resulted in most individuals leaving the real
estate market."); McCarthy, supra note 41, at 15 ("[T]he 1986 Tax Reform Act
canceled many of the benefits of limited partnerships and individually owned real
estate. That made REITs a relatively better place to hold real estate.").
'3 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
4" See, e.g., Philip S. Scherrer, Why REITs Face a Merger-Driven Consolidation Wave,
MERGERS & AcQuISITIONS, July 17, 1995, at 41, 41 ("During the last few years, the
property-owning real estate investment trust (REIT) has staged a dramatic comeback
in investor popularity."); Tessler, supra note 2, at A3 ("The REIT industry's total
market capitalization has ballooned from about $9 billion five years ago to about $73
billion today...." (quoting analyst Kevin Comer of BT Securities Inc.)).
" See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2 ("One of the.., most important major trends in
the REIT industry is the recent flurry of mergers and acquisitions activity."); Scherrer,
supra note 46, at 41-42 ("[I]t is the [REIT's] need for capital to fund future growth and
the pricing of that capital that should trigger a cycle of mergers and acquisitions.");
Barry Vinocur, Speculation on Potential Mergers Helps Fuel the Recent Rally in REIT Shares,
BARRON'S, Sept. 16, 1996, at 40, 40 ("[Tlhere is no question that there's increased
speculation about a wave of consolidations.").
48 See Scherrer, supra note 46, at 41 ("During the last few years, the property-
owning real estate investment trust (REIT) has staged a dramatic comeback in investor
popularity.... When the IPO frenzy subsided, there were clear indications that it may
have led to excesses and industry fragmentation which are likely to be corrected by
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions."); Vinocur, supra note 47, at 40
("Another factor [that is driving REIT share prices higher] is an influx of money into
REITs.... A number of firms specializing in REIT investing on behalf of institutions
report a significant inflow of fresh capital.").
49 See Byrt, supra note 3, at A9 (quoting Douglas Poutasse, managing director of
research for AEW Capital Management LP, as saying the REIT industry has "'grown
up'"); Vinocur, supra note 47, at 40 ("[T]he recent run-up in [REIT] prices has been
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REITs now have long-term growth strategies, making it easier for
managers to identify economically beneficial merger opportunities.-"
II. UPREITS
Up to this point, I have discussed REITs in their most basic form.
Most REITs, however, do not exist in this form. Real estate investors
have recently developed a derivation of the REIT called an Umbrella
Partnership Real Estate Investment Trust ("UPREIT"). The UPREIT
offers all the advantages of a basic REIT,5 ' but it also offers additional
tax advantages5 2 to sponsors. Currently, over seventy-five percent of
entities originally organized as REITs have adopted the UPREIT
structure.54
selective, which seems to underscore the contention that after exhibiting some
growing pains, the REIT industry is beginning to mature.").
so See Scherrer, supra note 46, at 42 ("The ability of a REIT to generate operating
income is based on its economies of scale and scope through internalization of
management and operations.").
5' As discussed in Part I.B. supra, the basic REIT structure offers three types of
advantages: diversification effects and the ability of the REIT to assume the liabilities
encumbering contributed property; increased bargaining power; and investment
returns that are less volatile than the stock market, but higher than other more
conservative investments. See discussion supra Part I.B.
12 Although the terminology differs in real estate literature, the distinction
between those who contribute real property to the UP and those who purchase REIT
stock in the equity markets is very important. Note, however, that this distinction is
not important when dealing with a basic REIT structure. See supra note 15. Generally,
those who contribute property are called "sponsors." Those who purchase REIT stock
in the stock market are called simply "investors." Both parties are investors in the
sense that they are contributing assets to an entity with the expectation that they will
receive some form of economic return. The difference between the two parties is a
function of the type of asset they contribute. Because "sponsors" contribute real
property, a primary motivation for their investment is the tax advantages an UP offers.
"Investors," in contrast, contribute cash by purchasing public shares of the REIT. The
primary motivations for these individuals, like all equity holders, are the dividends
paid out and the share appreciation, not the tax advantages.
53 See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
See McCarthy, supra note 41, at 16 ("Today, over 75% of new REITs take the
umbrella partnership form."); see also Covucci & Pace, supra note 3, at B10 ("Most of
the REITs formed in the recent boom are structured as umbrella partnership REITs,
or UPREITs.").
The majority of UPREITs are incorporated in Maryland, which was one of the first
states to enact legislation to attract REITs. Maryland also has minimal organization
and franchise taxes. See King, supra note 24, at 103-06 (outlining the flexibility of
Maryland's general corporation statute, its favorable case law precedent, and its
minimal organization and annual fee requirements as reasons for Maryland's
popularity in the area of UPREITs).
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The additional tax advantages UPREITs offer sponsors can be
significant, but they also lead to a number of potential conflicts
between the sponsors and investors.ss The effects of these conflicts
can be greatly exacerbated when an UPREIT is presented with a
merger or acquisition opportunity. Moreover, if industry experts are
correct, merger activity among UPREITs will only increase in future
years,- thus increasing the probability that disagreements between
sponsors and investors will come to the courts. Before analyzing the
approach courts should take in reviewing litigation concerning
UPREIT sponsors and investors, however, it is necessary to delve into
the arena of the Tax Code and analyze why such conflicts exist.
A. Organizational Structure of an UPREIT
An UPREIT is a combination of a partnership and a REIT . A
typical UPREIT starts with a group of real estate owners ("sponsors")
who form a limited partnership and contribute their property in
return for limited partnership interests. Simultaneously, a corpora-
tion contributes cash that it raised in a public offering in return for a
general partnership interest. The resulting partnership is called an
"umbrella partnership" ("UP").
In such an entity, the general managing partner is usually a
corporation that satisfies the REIT requirements of § 856.59 Thus,
such a partner is subject to the organizational, income, asset, and
' See discussion infra Part II.C-E.
See discussion supra Part I.C. Although this section discusses merger activity
among REITs, the vast majority of REITs to which the articles discussed therein refer
are UPREITs. Journalists writing on the subject use "REIT" as a generic term, inclusive
of both the basic REIT structure, see discussion supra Part I.A., and the UPREIT
derivation, see discussion supra Part II.A. Only those articles that are specifically
concerned with UPREITs make the terminological distinction.
57 For a basic discussion of the UPRE1T structure, see Lipton, supra note 25, at 850
(describing how an UPREIT is formed through a combination of a limited partnership
and a REIT).
The umbrella partnership can be thought of as an umbrella, with numerous
spines all connecting at its tip. These spines represent the limited partners in the
umbrella partnership. The umbrella staff and handle represent the managing partner
of the UPREIT.
"9 See Lipton, supra note 25, at 833 (arguing that the shift from the use of trusts to
the use of corporations to form REITs "appears to be based upon the greater flexibility
in corporate laws, the possible reduction in franchise tax and the increased ability of
corporations to indemnify officers and directors in the same manner as trusts").
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distributive tests applicable to a REIT.6W Because this REIT is also
usually a corporation, it has common stockholders. These share-
holders purchase common stock in the REIT and have no role in the
contribution of real property to the UP.6' They invest in the REIT for
the same reasons that most individuals invest in stocks-dividends
and the potential appreciation of the share price.
The limited partners ("sponsors") who contribute property to the
UP generally receive limited partnership interests that are convertible
into common stock of the UPREIT. 62 This conversion feature has the
potential to become problematic for both limited partners and
common stockholders.63
B. Why UPREITs Are Preferred over Basic REITs
The popularity of the UPREIT form stems from certain tax advan-
tages that the UPREIT offers over the REIT. A discussion of these
advantages follows.
1. Nonrecognition of Gain on Contribution of Property
Generally, under § 351(e) of the Tax Code, transfers of appreci-
ated property to a REIT are taxable events.6 Thus, under the basic
REIT form, a sponsor who contributes appreciated property to the
REIT must recognize gain in an amount equal to the excess of the
value of the stock received over the basis of the property contrib-
60 See discussion supra Part I.A. (discussing the requirements of I.R.C. §§ 856-857
(1994)).
61 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 25, at 850-51 (discussing the formation of an UPREIT
and the fact that common stockholders become involved with the UPREIT through a
public offering, whereas the limited partners obtain their interests by contributing real
property to the umbrella partnership).
62 The limited partners receive convertible interests to enhance the liquidity of
their investment. See id. at 850-51 ("In order to provide the [limited partners] with
liquidity, the [limited partners'] interests in the Umbrella Partnership are usually
convertible into stock of the UPREIT... ."); see also discussion infra Part II.C, E.2.
63 See discussion infra Part II.C, E.2.
I.R.C. § 351 (e) (1994) (excluding transfers of property to investment companies
from the tax exemption provisions of I.R.C. § 351). This is an exception to the general
rule of § 351 that contributions to a controlled corporation in exchange for stock are
not taxable to the shareholder. A "controlled corporation" is one where the
transferors own at least 80% of all voting stock and 80% of all outstanding stock
immediately after incorporation. See id. § 351. The Treasury Regulations include
REITs within the definition of "investment companies." SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c) (1)
(1994).
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uted.6s Section 351(e), however, applies only to corporations, not to
partnerships. Pursuant to § 721, the transfer of appreciated property
to a partnership does not result in the recognition of gain or loss to
the transferor.6 The shareholder's basis is said to "carryover," giving
the partnership the same basis in the transferred property that the
sponsor had.67
The effect of § 721 is to make the contribution of appreciated
property a nontaxable event when the property is contributed to a
partnership, but not when it is contributed to an investment company
like a REIT. By utilizing the UPREIT form, sponsors are able to con-
tribute their property to the UP, rather than to the REIT, with the
result of tax-free treatment.
2. Nonrecognition of Gain upon Partnership's
Assumption of Liabilities
Section 357(c) of the Tax Code requires that a taxpayer who con-
tributes property to a corporation must recognize gain to the extent
that the sum of any liabilities encumbering the property that the
corporation assumes exceeds the taxpayer's basis in the property.68
Section 357(c)'s requirement can be a problem for real estate
investors utilizing the basic REIT form. Because real estate frequently
has a low basis due to accumulated depreciation69 and may have been
65 This is generally called "precontribution gain." See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
I.R.C. § 721 (stating that transfer of property in exchange for a partnership
interest results in no recognition of loss or gain for either the partner or the
partnership).
67 Although under § 721 no precontribution gain is recognized by the transferors
on transfers to a partnership, the unrecognized gain is merely deferred, not
eliminated. Under § 704(c), any precontribution gain is allocated to the contributing
partner over the depreciable life of the asset or, if the property is sold by the
partnership before the end of its depreciable life, the precontribution gain is allocated
to the contributing partner upon disposition of the property. Id. § 704(c) (explaining
the allocation of precontribution gains); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3 (1994) (clarifying the
allocation of precontribution gains under I.R.C. § 704). The methods by which this
allocation is achieved are complex and beyond the scope of this Comment. The
general purpose of these provisions "is to prevent the shifting of tax consequences
among partners with respect to precontribution gain or loss." Id. § 1.704-3(a) (1).
See I.R.C. § 357(c). Gain is only recognized to the extent that the sum of the
liabilities assumed exceeds the contributor's basis in the property. Upon contribution,
the contributor reduces her basis in the asset, to the extent of liabilities assumed, until
her basis equals zero. The remaining value of the liabilities assumed is then
recognized as income. See id.
69 See Lipton, supra note 25, at 850. The relevant Tax Code provisions on
depreciation are contained in I.RC. §§ 167-168.
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refinanced, it is common for the property to be encumbered by
liabilities which exceed the property's adjusted basis.70  If such
property were contributed to a REIT, gain would have to be recog-
nized under § 357(c). If such property is contributed to a partnership
rather than to a corporation, however, § 731 stipulates that no gain or
loss is recognized by the transferor.7' Instead, the transferor reduces
her basis in the partnership to the extent of the excess of the
liabilities assumed by the partnership over her adjusted basis in the
contributed asset.n Thus, the transfer of liabilities in excess of basis is
nontaxable when the property is contributed to the UP.
3. Avoiding 5/50 Rule Problems
To ensure that REIT ownership is not concentrated in the hands
of a few wealthy investors, the Tax Code requires that a REIT not be
"closely held. " 73 Section 856(h), which incorporates the requirements
of § 542 (a) (2), requires that no more than fifty percent of the stock of
a REIT be held directly or indirectly by five or fewer persons.74 This is
commonly referred to as the "5/50 Rule."75 However, the UPREIT
structure allows sponsors and investors to circumvent this require-
ment, because the 5/50 Rule applies only to the REIT, not to the
UP.76 Thus, an UP can be formed by fewer than five people owning
greater than fifty percent of the UP, as long as the sponsors
contribute their property to the UP rather than to the REIT.
C. Conflicts Regarding Business Decisions of the UPREIT
The ownership of the UP is shared by the limited partners who
contributed property to the partnership and the general partner,
70 See Lipton, supra note 25, at 851 ("In many situations, the contributed property is
subject to liabilities equal to 80% or more of the fair market value of the contributed
property....").
71 See I.R.C. § 731 (stating that distributions by a partnership to a partner shall not
be recognized as a loss or a gain).
See id.(describing how losses and gains in excess of the adjusted basis of a
partner's interest in a partnership should be calculated).
73 Id. § 856(a) (6), (h). For further explanation of the "closely held" determina-
tion, see discussion supra Part I.A.1.
" See id. § 856.
75 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
76 See Crnkovich, supra note 35, at 68 ("The 5/50 rule could in many instances be
violated if the sponsors were to acquire their interests in the REIT due to a
concentration of REIT ownership in the sponsors and a few large institutional
investors .... By giving the sponsors interests in the UP, that aggregation is avoided.").
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which is generally a publicly traded REIT. Because the REIT is the
managing partner of the UP, it is responsible for the strategic
direction of the UP, and the management and administration of the
properties held by the UP.77 This would seem to be an acceptable
relationship, assuming the limited partners and the REIT share the
goals of successfully furthering the business of the UP. The REIT,
the managing partner of the UP, however, commonly is also a
publicly traded corporation owned by common stockholders.7
Through their ownership of the REIT, these common stockholders
also have a voice in the management of the UP.
In theory, management of an UPREIT should not be contentious.
The limited partners, simply because they are "limited" partners,
should not expect to have a voice in the management of either the
REIT or the UP.? After all, these individuals voluntarily accepted
limited partnership interests in exchange for the assurance that they
could not be held personally responsible for any liability the UP
incurs. The problem is that most UPREITs are not structured in this
way.
In most UPREITs, the limited partners receive limited partner-
ship interests that are convertible into common stock of the
managing partner REIT. The primary purpose of this feature is to
give limited partners a degree of liquidity in their investment."'
Rather than being restricted to holding an illiquid limited
The general partner is responsible for the management of the partnership and
is responsible for any liability the partnership incurs. The "limited partners" have no
voice in the management of the partnership and are liable only to the extent of the
amount of capital they have invested in the partnership. See generally Robert W.
Hamilton, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS § 13.5 (1989) (discussing the
evolution and characteristics of limited partnerships).
78 See discussion supra Part II.A.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See Crnkovich, supra note 35, at 67 n.2 ("[T]he sponsors are given options to
convert their interests in the UP for interests in the REIT."); Lipton, supra note 25, at
850-51 ("[T]he Transferors' interest in the Umbrella Partnership are usually
convertible into stock of the UPREIT at a future time at the option of the
Transferors.").
8' See Covucci & Pace, supra note 3, at B10 (noting that limited partnership unit
holders "have certain rights to convert the units to REIT shares and sell these shares in
the public marketplace if they desire the liquidity"); Gary A. Cutson, Formation and
Operation of a REIT/UPREIT: Income Tax Considerations, in REITS 1994: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW Now, supra note 24, at 119, 121 ("The property owners can 'put' their
UPREIT partnership units to the UPREIT or REIT in exchange for cash or REIT stock,
at the UPREIT/REIT's election. The exchange is generally on a one-for-one basis or
the current trading value of a REIT share. Thus, the property owner obtains
liquidity.").
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partnership interest, the partners can convert their interests to
common stock and then sell the stock. More importantly, however,
the convertibility feature gives the limited partners the opportunity to
gain substantial ownership interest in the REIT, thus giving them a
voice in the REIT's role as managing partner of the UP.
The UPREIT limited partners, who are responsible for
contributing the real estate to the UP, generally receive limited
partnership interests that, if converted simultaneously into common
stock of the managing partner REIT, would give the limited partners
controlling ownership in the REIT.8 Limited partners are presuma-
bly given such large convertible interests because the value of the
property contributed by the partners greatly exceeds the relative
investments of the individual investors who own stock in the REIT.
Furthermore, the limited partners are generally real estate profes-
sionals experienced in the acquisition and management of real estate
properties whose expertise made formation of the UPREIT possible."
8' The conversion of these shares is a taxable event for the limited partners.
Conversion of a limited partner's interest in the partnership to common stock
ownership in the corporate REIT is construed as a redemption of the partnership
interest and triggers taxable gain if the value of the common shares in the REIT
received by the partner exceeds the partner's basis in the partnership. I.R.C. § 737
(1994) ("In the case of any distribution by a partnership to a partner, such partner
shall be treated as recognizing gain in an amount equal to... the excess ... of the fair
market value of property... received in the distribution over the adjusted basis of
such partner's interest in the partnership."). There are also other scenarios where the
convertibility of the limited partnership interests could provide tax liability problems
for the limited partners. Pursuant to several Code provisions, the IRS could view the
UP as the alter ego of the UPREIT due to the convertibility feature and tax the
property contributions of the limited partners retroactively. See id. §§ 737,
707(a)(2)(B), 721; Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(c)(1) (1996). The specific tax issues are
beyond the scope of this Comment. For further discussion of the concerns
surrounding UPREITs, see Lipton, supra note 25, at 854-56; Crnkovich, supra note 35,
at 73.
83 See Barry Vinocur, Sam Zell's Offer for Chateau Properties Exposes a Raw in a Common
REIT Structure, BARRON'S, Aug. 26, 1996, at 34, 34 (noting that umbrella partnership
limited partners often own substantial equity shares in the corresponding UPREIT,
and listing the UPREITs in which limited partners own the greatest amount of equity).
In this article, Vinocur discusses the susceptibility of UPREITs to breach of
fiduciary duty claims because of the fact that limited partners have such large equity
interests in the REIT. Vinocur terms this the UPREIT's "Achilles' heel" and feels that
this makes UPREITs likely takeover targets: "'A lot of people are busy putting together
lists detailing the ownership structure of UPREITs. Clearly, there are going to be
investment bankers ... trying to figure out which companies that have a large
percentage of the company in operating partnership units are the best targets.'" Id.
(quoting an unnamed Wall Street "veteran" analyst).
84 See Lipton, supra note 25, at 858-59 ("[Mlany of the sponsors of UPREITs have
been involved in property management ... ."); Alfred D. Youngwood & Deborah B.
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Thus, they expect to have a voice in the management of the
UPREIT.
With all of these factors in mind, the common shareholders of the
REIT must elect a board of directors to represent their interests.
Generally, limited partners in the UP are also either members of the
REIT board of directors, or are influential enough to have their
interests strongly represented on the board.8' At first glance, the
limited partners of the UP seem to be the logical choice as represen-
tatives. They are real estate professionals who were responsible for
contributing the properties that the UPREIT is now managing, and
thus are likely to be well versed in the real estate trade and in the
management of the properties they once owned individually. In
addition, they are potential shareholders in the REIT because they
have the option to convert their shares. This last factor would seem to
imply that the limited partners' goals would be the same as those of
the common shareholders, thus limiting the possibility that conflict
will arise. The actual shareholders of the REIT must not forget,
however, that the limited partners may also have conflicting interests.
Though they are potentially large shareholders, their original intent
in forming the UPREIT was to realize all of the tax and financial
87advantages that the UPREIT structure offered them.
Contributing to the UP may have allowed a limited partner to
relieve herself of personal liability on the contributed property or to
defer the recognition of gain on the property if it had appreciated-
advantages unrelated to, and even at odds with, the interests of the
Weiss, Partners and Partnerships-Aggregate vs. Entity Outside of Subchapter K 48 TAx LAW.
39, 53 (1994) ("An UPREIT is a REIT that invests indirectly in real estate by
transferring cash to an operating partnership to which the other partners (primarily
real estate developers and other owners of real estate) contribute property.. ").
Note that in many cases, if all of the UP limited partners were simultaneously to
convert their interests into REIT common stock, the resulting equity structure of the
REIT would violate the "5/50 rule." See discussion supra Part I.A.1. This may or may
not be a problem, depending on the factual circumstances of the relevant transaction.
For example, the fact that conversion would cause the UPREIT to lose its favored tax
status under I.R.C. §§ 856-857 would not be troublesome if the limited partners
intended to merge with another REIT entity or to sell all of the UPREIT's assets-such
a business plan would not require that the existing UPREIT structure survive. Thus,
the fact that it would lose its favored tax status would be irrelevant.
86 SeeVinocur, supra note 83, at 34 (discussing UPREITs which have the majority of
their equity contained in convertible limited partnership interests and the fact that the
owners of these interests have a fiduciary obligation to other shareholders).
87 For an explanation of the tax advantages that UPREITs offer individual property
contributors, see discussion supra Part II.B.
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common shareholders.& For these reasons and those discussed
below, the limited partners may have different goals than the
common shareholders. Shareholders and courts must recognize that
it would be overly simplistic to assume that the economic self-interests
of limited partners (acting in a fiduciary capacity vis-a-vis the common
shareholders) are always perfectly correlated with the interests of the
common stockholders.
D. Conflicts Regarding Ordinary Business Transactions
As discussed above, the limited partners in the UP are usually
its directors, or they at least have substantial equity interests in the
REIT and, thus, are a strong influence on the decisions of the REIT
board of directors. 89 This can lead to different types of conflicts
between the limited partners and the common stockholders. As
directors, the limited partners are required to act as fiduciaries for the
common stockholders, but they may also have independent interests
in their capacity as limited partners that conflict with their fiduciary
duties to these shareholders. Below are examples of potential
conflicts that may arise in the course of an UPREIT's ordinary
business dealings.
1. Paydown of Property Debt
An UPREIT is formed by two independent transactions. In
one transaction, limited partners contribute real property to the UP.
Simultaneous with this transfer, a corporate REIT issues stock. The
proceeds received from this offering are then contributed to the UP.
The most common use for this cash influx is to pay down debt associ-
ated with the properties.9° Any reduction of liabilities assumed by the
Common stockholders are interested in the rate of return they earn on their
investment in the REIT (i.e., dividends and share price appreciation). They do not
have the concerns regarding individual tax liability that the limited partners have. For
example, the common stockholders would likely support a decision of the REIT board
to sell certain properties if the board expected such a decision to increase investment
returns for the stockholders. The limited partners, however, might oppose such a
decision if it meant that a number of limited partners would have to recognize taxable
gain on the disposition of the property. See discussion infra Part II.D-E.
89 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Crnkovich, supra note 35, at 69 ("On the contribution of cash by the
REIT to the operating partnerships through the UP, debt will be reduced."); Lipton,
supra note 25, at 851 ("The cash which is contributed to the UPREIT by the public
shareholders can be used in one of several ways. Most frequently, the cash is used to
pay down a portion of the liabilities which encumber the contributed property.").
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UP, however, is also treated as an income distribution to the partners
under § 752(b).9' The partners must recognize income to the extent
that their share of the debt reduction exceeds their basis in the
partnership. 92 Thus, it may not be in the partners' economic self-
interest to have REIT funds allocated toward debt reduction. The
common shareholders in the REIT, however, do not share these
concerns. They did not contribute property and thus are not
concerned with the tax effects of §§ 752(b) and 731. For them, it may
be economically advantageous for the REIT to use its cash to reduce
the debt on the UP's properties93 (for example, using cash to reduce
debt on UP properties would be beneficial if interest rates were
expected to rise on the mortgages encumbering those properties).
Limited partners who sit on the board of the REIT will have a conflict
of interest in this respect-do they allocate cash towards reducing
debt on various properties when it means greater individual tax
liability for themselves?
2. Built-In Gains and Losses
A second conflict that arises in the context of ordinary business
operations relates to the fair market value of the properties that an
UPREIT holds. The property contributed by limited partners to an
UP is usually "built-in" gain property.94 This means the fair market
value of the asset exceeds the contributor's adjusted tax basis of the
asset at the time of contribution.9 Section 704(c) requires the
contributing partner to recognize the amount of built-in gain on the
property if the partnership later disposes of it.96 This causes another
" I.R.C. § 752(b) (1994) ("Any decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of a
partnership ... shall be considered as a distribution of money to the partner by the
partnership.").
See id. § 731 ("In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner, gain
shall .. , be recognized to such partner... to the extent that any money distributed
exceeds the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership.").
9-' Assuming the market values of certain properties were expected to drop for
whatever reason, it would be beneficial to dispose of those properties.
0' See Covucci & Pace, supra note 3, at B1O ("The property being contributed will,
quite frequently, be property that has a lower tax basis than fair market value, because
of market appreciation and tax depreciation, and, therefore, be subject to a 'built-in
gain.'").
95 Precontribution gain property is common with real assets because depreciation
deductions lower the adjusted basis of the property annually. This reduction in basis is
not correlated with the fair market value of the property, which is determined by
market forces.
See I.R.C. § 704(c).
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potential conflict between the limited partners and the shareholders.
The limited partners will not want the UP to sell contributed property
if it means that the partners will have to recognize substantial gains
on the transactions. The shareholders obviously will not share this
concern, because they will not be exposed to any of the tax liability
that would befall the partners in such a transaction. Thus, common
stockholders would favor a sale of contributed property if, for
example, its market value were expected to decline. 9' Limited
partners, however, may oppose such a disposition if it means that
certain partners will have to recognize large taxable gains on the
property that they originally contributed to the UP.
In addition to the effect on sales of contributed property, § 704
also applies to the allocation of depreciation deductions taken by the
UP on built-in gain property.98 A partner who contributes built-in
gain property generally receives lesser depreciation deductions than
the other limited partners when the deductions are passed through
from the UP to the limited partner.9 This is because the contributing
partner must account for the built-in gain of the property in her
annual depreciation deductions for that property. The amount of
depreciation allowed for the contributing partner is adjusted so that
the partner recognizes a portion of the gain each year. This amount
is taken against the annual depreciation deduction the partner would
normally receive. The UP does have its choice of three different
allocation methods for accomplishing this, but each of these methods
amounts to the contributing partner having to recognize the amount
of built-in gain on his contributed property incrementally over the
useful life of the property.100
97 Note that this conflict is greatly exacerbated when limited partners in the UP
also sit on the board of directors of the REIT, and thus ultimately bear the
responsibility for the business decision of whether to use cash to reduce the debt on
UP properties. See discussion supra Part II.C.
9 See I.R.C. § 704(c).
" See Crnkovich, supra note 35, at 72 (discussing 704(c) allocations).
'0 See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1) (1996) ("Under section 704(c) a
partnership must allocate income, gain, loss, and deduction with respect to property
contributed by a partner... so as to take into account any variation between the
adjusted tax basis of the property and its fair market value at the time of
contribution."). The details of this provision are beyond the scope of this Comment.
PUSHING THE CORPORATE LA WENVELOPE
E. Conflicts Regarding Merger and Acquisition Activity
A merger or acquisition scenario precipitates further and more
significant conflicts, beyond the potential conflicts involving the daily
operations of UPREITs. The underlying foundation for such conflicts
is, again, a function of the differences between the limited partners
and the common shareholders. As previously discussed, these differ-
ences are exacerbated when the limited partners sit on the board of
directors of the REIT.'0 ' The limited partners who sit on the board
are forced to recognize a fiduciary duty toward the common
shareholders, despite their goals as limited partners.' Although
there has been very little litigation involving UPREITs in a takeover or
merger scenario, as UPREITs begin to merge more frequently, the
amount of litigation in this area will increase.' The following discus-
'0' See discussion supra Part II.C.
,2 See, e.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141 (c) (1991) (noting that a board of directors
may not delegate its responsibility to inform stockholders of sale, lease, or exchange of
the corporation's assets, or other major changes in the corporation or its bylaws). The
fact that board members have fiduciary duties to stockholders is not mentioned
explicitly in the statute. It is, however, a concept of corporate governance that
fundamentally underlies corporate law. See, e.g., Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp.,
Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 540 (Del. 1996) ("[C]orporate directors.., are acting as fiduciaries
of the stockholders in managing the business and affairs of the corporation."); Harden
v. Eastern States Pub. Serv. Co., 122 A. 705, 712 (Del. Ch. 1923) ("While the
corporation is the owner of the assets.., their control and management rest in the
officers and directors, whose relation to the assets is one of a fiduciary character.").
'" See, e.g., Erica Copulsky, Hostile Bid May Alter REIT Industry, MERGERS &
AcQUISMONs REP., Aug. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11277553 ("'We've been
expecting hostile bids in the REIT business.' ... REIT mergers and acquisitions to
date have been friendly because of REIT regulations, among other issues, but these
unsolicited bids may be the impetus for accelerated consolidation among public
REITs." (quoting Paine Webber REIT analystJohn Litt)).
Ther6 has been only one case that involved an UPREIT in the context of a hostile
acquisition: the litigation surrounding Manufactured Home Communities Inc., an
UPREIT operating out of Chicago, and its hostile tender offer for Chateau Properties
Inc., an UPREIT operating in Michigan. The lawsuit was ultimately dropped by MHC.
Briefs submitted by the parties on MHC's motion for a preliminary injunction (seeking
to enjoin various takeover defenses instituted by Chateau) discussed the potential
conflicts that may arise with UPREITs in hostile acquisitions. See discussion infra Part
II.E.1-2. For a discussion of the takeover battle that occurred between the two parties,
see Copulsky, supra, Mitchell Pacelle, Chateau Sweetens Terms of Merger Plan with ROC,
Sues to Halt Sam Zell's Offer, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1996, at A4; Mitchell Pacelle,
Manufactured Home's Zell to Launch a Hostile Offer for Chateau Properties, WALL ST. J., Sept.
4, 1996, atA4.
1997] 1587
1588 UNIVERSITY OFPENSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 145:1565
sion analyzes a number of ways in which the limited partners of an UP
may find themselves in conflict with the shareholders of a REIT.'"
1. Structure of the Merger/Acquisition Transaction
If a corporate bidder makes an acquisition or merger offer for an
UPREIT, the bidder can easily structure the offer to place the
interests of the limited partners and the shareholders at odds. An
example occurred in September 1996, when an UPREIT,
Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. ("MHC"), made a tender
offer for another UPREIT, Chateau Properties, Inc. ("Chateau"). ' 05
MHC offered to purchase Chateau shares in exchange for either
twenty-six dollars in cash, or for MHC stock, which was valued (at the
time of the initial tender offer) at $21.28 per share.' °6 Chateau's
shareholders logically favored the twenty-six dollar cash option, as it
was worth almost five dollars more per share than the MHC stock.
The bifurcated offer, however, placed Chateau's limited partners
(who also controlled the Chateau board) in a precarious position.'7
Accepting the cash offer would have meant that the limited partners
would have had to recognize capital gain under § 741 in an amount
'0' An important assumption underlying this discussion is that the limited partners
in the UP will either be directors of the REIT or will have such a large potential
interest in the REIT (through the convertibility of their limited partnership interests)
that they will wield considerable influence over the business decisions of the REIT. As
discussed supra, this is a safe assumption. See discussion supra Part II.C.
'05 Both MHC and Chateau are UPREITs and, thus, both are managing partners in
umbrella partnerships managed by each respective UPREIT (MHC Operating Limited
Partnership and Chateau Properties Limited Partnership, respectively).
'6 See Steven Lipin, Bidding War Breaks Out for Chateau as Sun Communities Makes
Rival Offer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1996, at A4 (explaining the offer made by MHC and
its valuation).
"' Prior to MHC's tender offer, Chateau had approximately 6 million shares of
outstanding common stock. It also had approximately 8.8 million shares of
convertible partnership interests outstanding. Thus, approximately 60% of Chateau's
equity was in the form of nonvoting convertible partnership interests, while the
remaining 40% was held by common shareholders who did have voting rights. See id.
("About 60% of the equity is in the form of [operating partnership units], which carry
a potentially bigger tax bill, while 40% is in the form of shares. But only shareholders
have voting rights."). Of the 8.8 million partnership interests, Chateau board
members owned approximately 4.2 million. See Defendant's Answer and Verified
Counterclaims and Third Party Complaint at 17, Chateau Properties, Inc. v.
Manufactured Home Communities, Inc., No. WMN-96-2930 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 1996);
CHATEAU PROPERTIES, INC., 1994 PROXY STATEMENT, at 3. Thus, if the Chateau board
members would have converted their partnership interests into common stock, they
would have held approximately 28% of the outstanding Chateau common stock.
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equal to the amount of gain they originally deferred under § 721.1s
Industry analysts estimated that if the limited partners were to accept
the cash offer they would end up keeping approximately $19 of the
$26 value, with the remaining portion going to taxes.') 9 On the other
hand, if the limited partners accepted MHC stock in exchange for
their shares, the merger would be tax-free, and the partners could
continue to defer their § 351 gains."0 Thus, their personal interests
were in direct conflict with the interests of the stockholders. Though
it was in the shareholders' interests to accept the cash tender offer, it
was in the limited partners' interests to accept the stock swap offer
because it would allow the partners to continue to defer their
respective shares of § 351 gains.
2. Conversion of Limited Partnership Interests
Another conflict between managers and shareholders which arises
in the UPREIT merger/acquisition context, and one which was
present in the MHC/Chateau battle, involves the convertibility of the
limited partners' interests. The partnership interests held by the
limited partners are "limited" and thus non-voting. However, they are
also convertible to common shares in the REIT. Conversion of these
interests, however, is a taxable transaction."' It would require the
partners to recognize gain to the extent that gain was deferred when
the partners originally contributed their property to the UP."
2
Section 721 allows the limited partners to defer built-in gains at the
'*3 I.R.C. § 741 (1994) (noting that gain or loss shall be recognized to the
transferor partner in the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership and
will be considered a gain or loss resulting from the sale or exchange of a capital asset);
see also Treas. Reg. § 1.741-1 (1996) (explaining the type and character of gain or loss
recognized on the sale or exchange of a partnership interest). For further discussion,
see infra Part II.E.2.
,9 See Vinocur, supra note 83, at 34 (explaining the tax ramifications for Chateau
board members if they accepted MHC's cash offer for their partnership interests).
"o So-called "stock-swap" mergers are generally tax-free under I.R.C. § 354 (a) (1).
The rationale for tax-free treatment in such a reorganization is based on the
'continuity of interest" doctrine. See, e.g., Note, Three-Party Mergers: The Fourth Form of
Corporate Acquisition, 57 VA. L. REV. 1242, 1243 (1971) (explaining the concepts and
mechanics of mergers generally and triangular mergers specifically). This doctrine
recognizes that when shareholders are exchanging their stock for stock in another
corporation, the nature of their investment is not fundamentally changing, as it would
be if the shareholders sold their shares for cash. The details of the taxation of
shareholders on a merger are beyond the scope of this Comment.
. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
n2 See I.R.C. § 741 ("In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a
partnership, gain or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner.").
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time of contribution by requiring the partners to subtract the amount
of deferred gain from their basis in the partnership.13 If the partners
subsequently convert their partnership interests into common stock,
they are required to recognize the deferred gain."
4
Chateau's response to MHC's tender offer presented an
interesting twist to this conversion issue, and an illustration of the
power limited partners have over a REIT and its common
shareholders. The limited partner-dominated Chateau board"5
declined the MHC tender offer in favor of a merger with another
UPREIT that allowed the Chateau partners to defer their personal tax
liabilities and to transfer those liabilities to the shareholders of the
merged entity.1 16 The effects of such a transaction would clearly not
be in the shareholders' interests. First, the transaction would allow
continued deferral of § 351 gain, 17 even though recognition of these
gains would benefit shareholders by stepping-up the company's tax
basis in its underlying properties, thus allowing greater depreciation
deductions for the UPREIT." a Second, the continued deferral would
cause a higher proportion of the dividends received by Chateau
shareholders to be taxable as income or capital gains, rather than
See id. § 721.
" See id. § 741 ("Such gain or loss shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset. .. ").
1 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
116 The net effect of such a transaction is that the limited partners would be able to
escape the recognition of built-in gain on property they contributed. The gains would
continue to be deferred, but would be transferred to the balance sheet of the merged
entity-in effect, becoming the liabilities of the common shareholders. MHC
challenged this action in federal court on the grounds that it is a breach of the
Chateau director's fiduciary duty. See Defendant's Answer and Verified Counterclaims
and Third Party Complaint at 7, Chateau Properties Inc. v. Manufactured Home
Communities, Inc., No. WMN-96-2930 (N.D. Md. Sept. 26, 1996). The lawsuit was
eventually dropped by MHC after a Maryland district court judge hinted in a
temporary restraining order hearing that the court would not be sympathetic to
MHC's claims. See discussion infra note 172 and accompanying text. The tax details of
the transaction are beyond the scope of this Comment, but its validity (with respect to
the Tax Code) was not challenged by MHC in the litigation. MHC instead brought the
action under a breach of fiduciary duty claim. This transfer of the partners' personal
tax liability to the common shareholders would have been an unprecedented
transaction in the history of UPREITs and an issue of first-impression (based on
representations made in the defendants' counterclaim). See Memorandum of
Defendants in Support of Their Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 8,
Chateau (No. WMN-96-2930).
1 I.R.C. § 351; see also discussion supra Part II.B.1.
1 SeeI.R.C. § 1016(a) (explaining that recognized gains are added to the tax basis
of an asset).
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non-taxable as returns of capital." 9 Third, it would simply be inequi-
table to allow the limited partners to transfer their personal tax
liabilities to common shareholders. If such a transaction were
permitted, the limited partners would effectively circumvent the tax
laws to the detriment of the common shareholders, even when the
partners bear a fiduciary duty to those same shareholders.20 The net
effect of permitting limited partners to convert their non-voting
interests to voting interests is to allow them both the benefits of defer-
ring gains on the contribution of property to a partnership (§ 721), as
well as the benefits of attaining voting power in the corporation
(through the UPREIT), which normally would not be available unless
gain had been recognized on the contributed property. Furthermore,
the limited partners would be saddling shareholders with their
personal tax liabilities. Thus, allowing such a transaction would be
tantamount to allowing the limited partners to realize all of the
benefits of the UPREIT, while circumventing the tax rules governing
it. Finally, conversion of the partners' interests to common shares
would give the partners control in most UPREITs (in Chateau's case,
conversion would have given the limited partners sixty percent owner-
ship) .12' This conversion, in turn, ensures the partners' victory in any
sort of shareholder vote.'2
"9 This relates to the REIT not stepping up its basis in the assets and the fact that
any REIT distributions to shareholders, in excess of that shareholder's basis in the
REIT, are taxable as capital gains (instead of being nontaxable returns of capital). See
1.LRC. § 301(c)(3) (stating that the portion of the distribution that exceeds the
adjusted basis of the stock is treated as gain from the sale or exchange of property);
Treas. Reg. § 1.857-6(a) (1996) ("A shareholder receiving dividends from a real estate
investment trust shall include such dividends in gross income for the taxable year in
which they are received."); Lipton, supra note 25, at 848-49 ("If the distributions in
excess of current and accumulated earnings and profits also exceed the shareholder's
basis, the excess would be capital gains to the shareholder."). The details, however,
are beyond the scope of this Comment.
120 Note that the amount of tax liability transferred may or may not be significant.
In the case of Chateau, the limited partners sought to transfer approximately $100
million of deferred gains. See Memorandum of Defendants in Support of Their
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Chateau (No. WMN-96-2930). As a
point of reference, MHC's cash tender offer was valued at approximately $400 million.
See Lipin, supra note 106, atA4.
121 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
'2 A conversion of this magnitude would cause a REIT to violate the 5/50 rule,
thus causing the REIT to lose its favored tax status. However, this would be of no
concern to the limited partners if their goal was to terminate the existence of the
UPREIT and merge its assets or equity into another entity. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
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III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF UPREITs
The conflicts engendered by the UPREIT structure are a function
of the Tax Code. Yet, although these conflicts have their foundation
in the tax law, they also affect the fiduciary relationship of the
controlling parties and the common stockholders in an UPREIT. A
court sitting in review of an UPREIT fiduciary breach case must con-
sider how these conflicts may distort the thinking of an UPREIT
board member or majority shareholder. The fact that there are so
many possible conflicts in an UPREIT structure demands that a court
review the decisions of an UPREIT fiduciary with greater scrutiny
than is usually given the actions of a fiduciary in a normal corporate
entity. It is therefore useful to summarize the current judicial review
doctrines applicable to business organizations generally, before
analyzing their applicability to UPREITs specificallyis
A. Business Judgment
Courts reviewing corporate litigation are generally very
deferential to the business decisions made by a board of directors:
"[A] court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the
[board's] decision can be 'attributed to any rational business
purpose. ' ' 24 Court refer to this deference as the "business judgment
rule. " |25 The rule provides the "presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
' In discussing standards of judicial review, I rely on Delaware precedent,
although most UPREITs are incorporated in Maryland. See King, supra note 24, at 103
(stating that Maryland is the "current corporate domicile of choice for many REITs");
MFHC Countersuit Names Chateau Properties, ROC WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1996, at B9
(stating that "virtually all" REITs are incorporated in Maryland). Maryland, however,
models its corporate law after that of Delaware. See, e.g., Grill v. Hoblitzel, 771 F. Supp.
709, 712 n.3 (D. Md. 1991) (relying on Delaware precedent); Independent
Distributors , Inc. v. Katz, 637 A.2d 886, 893-94 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (same).
Because many states are rapidly enacting more favorable REIT legislation, it is likely
that newer REITs will file in the state in which they are located. See King, supra note
24, at 105 (recognizing that some new REITs are choosing not to incorporate in
Maryland, but rather in the state where their principal operations are located).
However, because Delaware law continues to be the most persuasive precedent in the
state corporate law area, I utilize it in my analysis.
,21 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
125 .
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basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company.
" 126
Although a court is generally deferential to the ordinary business
decisions of a board, the factfinder will apply a heightened level of
scrutiny when the board takes action in response to a takeover bid:
"Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred."
When the board takes action in the face of a takeover bid,
Delaware courts apply the two-pronged Unocal test, which must be
satisfied if the board is to be granted business judgment deference.2
First, the board must show "that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed."'2 This burden is satisfied if the board shows "'good faith
and reasonable investigation'" in arriving at its decision's Proof that
the board reasonably perceived a threat is "materially enhanced.., by
the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside
independent directors."' Second, the board must satisfy a
.proportionality test, " 1 which requires it to show that its response to
a takeover bid was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed" (i.e., a
12 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). In
addition to being a substantive rule of law that grants deference to directors' decisions,
the business judgment rule is also a procedural burden-shifting device. See Cinerama,
Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) ("As a procedural guide the
business judgment presumption is a rule of evidence that places the initial burden of
proof on the plaintiff."). Plaintiffs challenging a board's decision bear the initial
burden of proving that courts should not apply business judgment deference. If the
plaintiff successfully rebuts the business judgment rule, the burden then shifts to the
directors to establish the "entire fairness" of the transaction. Seeid.
'2 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; see also Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962)
(concluding that in light of the conflict of interest for directors which is inherent in a
takeover bid, heightened scrutiny is warranted).
1 Unoca4 493 A.2d at 955. For a recent and more thorough explanation of the
Unocal standard, see Unitin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372 n.9 (Del.
1995).
129 Unocal 493 A.2d at 955.
I Id. (quoting Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964)).
" Id. An "outside director" is defined by Delaware courts as "a non-employee and
non-management director." Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375. "Independent" is defined by
Delaware courts as meaning "that a director's decision is based on the corporate
merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or
influences." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816.
132 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (emphasis omitted).
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proportional response) :133 "This entails an analysis by the directors of
the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enter-
prise."' 3 The Delaware Supreme Court recently elaborated on this
test in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., explaining that a board
will satisfy the proportionality test if its defensive actions are: (1) not
"draconian," (i.e., coercive or preclusive) and (2) are within a range
of reasonableness.'3 5
The test laid out in Unocal should be flexibly applied: "The
enhancedjudicial scrutiny mandated by Unocal is not intended to lead
to a structured, mechanistic, mathematical exercise.",36 In fact, since
the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 7 a watershed case in merger and acquisition law,
legal practitioners have viewed boards as having broad discretion both
in their determinations of whether takeover bids represent threats to
corporations and in their responses to these perceived threats.)
In Time, the Time board rejected a tender offer by Paramount and
instead pursued a friendly merger with Warner Brothers. Paramount
sued Time, claiming that the actions of Time's board precluded its
shareholders from entertaining Paramount's tender offer. 3 9 Time's
board defended its actions on the grounds that it had carefully
considered the opportunity to merge with Warner Brothers and that
the Warner Brothers merger represented the best strategic fit for the
' Unoca4 493 A.2d at 955.
134 Id.
1-" 651 A.2d at 1383-84, 1386-87. Unitrin defines any defensive tactic as "draconian"
if it is either "coercive" or "preclusive." Id. at 1387. An example of a coercive tactic is
when a board "'cram[s] down' on its shareholders a management-sponsored
alternative." Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155
(Del. 1990). A preclusive tactic is when a board takes action that entirely prevents
some form of shareholder action (for example, a shareholder vote, a proxy fight, a
bidder's ability to make a tender offer, or a shareholder's group to tender their
shares). See id.
... Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373.
"37 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
' See, e.g., Melissa M. Kurp, Corporate Takeover Defenses AflerQVC: Can Target Boards
Prevent Hostile Tender Offers Without Breaching Their Fiduciay Duties?,2 6 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
29, 40 (1994) ("In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the Delaware Supreme
Court reintroduced the discretion given to target boards as exemplified in UnocaL"
(citations omitted)); Schwartz et al., supra note 7, at 455-56 ("The Delaware Supreme
Court's opinion, which upheld Time's revised merger agreement with Warner and
therefore precluded Time shareholders from accepting Paramount's tender
offer... constitutes an unequivocal endorsement of director prerogatives.").
"9 Time, 571 A.2d at 1142.
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Time corporation. 4 ' Because this type of rationale for rejecting a
tender offer is rather generic (in the sense that any board could
defend an action by saying the board acted for "strategic reasons"), it
is often referred to as a "Just Say No" defense.'
4'
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Time reinforced the
primacy of the business judgment rule in corporate law. Only in
limited circumstances will a court inquire into the business decisions
of a corporate board.4 4 Thus, any litigation concerning the business
decisions of corporate fiduciaries is very likely to be reviewed under
the business judgment rule.
B. Entire Fairness
In situations where certain conflicts of interest exist between a
board or controlling shareholder and the common shareholders, a
court will apply the entire fairness standard, a much stricter standard
of review than the business judgment rule.'43 Entire fairness only
applies when there is an actual conflict. There must be some evi-
dence that the fiduciaries took some type of action which was not in
the best interests of the shareholders. The court will presume that as
a result of those conflicts, the decisions made by the fiduciary were
"4' See id. at 1144-45. "The primary concern of Time's outside directors was the
preservation of the 'Time Culture.' [The directors] believed that Time had become
recognized in this country as an institution built upon a foundation of journalistic
integrity .... [and] feared that a merger with an entertainment company
would.., threaten the Time Culture." Id. at 1143 n.4.
.. See, e.g., Daniel A. Dreisbach & Catherine G. Wagner, The Right of the Target's
Board to Just Say No' in Delaware INSIGHTS, March 1996, at 25, 25, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Insite File (discussing the Delaware District Court's opinion in Moore
Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Del. 1995), and stating
that "the court reaffirmed the right of a target's board to reject a hostile bid, i.e. the
just say no' defense"); Schwartz et al., supra note 7, at 487 (discussing the
development of the "Just Say No" cases); Patricia A. Vlahakis, "Just Say No" Made Easier:.
Lessons in "Just Saying Yes'; 1990 INST. ON SEC. REG. 331, 333 ("In [Time], the Delaware
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the primacy of the Board of Directors... and has
rejected the 'let the stockholders decide' refrain of the 1980's.").
142 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("[T]he
business judgment rule attaches to protect corporate officers and directors and the
decisions they make, and our courts will not second-guess these business judgments.").
'4 SeeWeinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("When directors of
a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the
bargain."); see also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del.
1994) ("A controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a
transaction ... bears the burden of proving its entire fairness.").
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more likely to be affected by bias.'" Because of the greater likelihood
that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred, courts will scrutinize the
fiduciary's decision.' Instead of deferring to the business judgment
of the board, the court places the burden on the board to prove the
"entire fairness" of the transaction: "The requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a
transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, suffi-
cient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts."'4
The entire fairness test includes two prongs: fair dealing and fair
price.4 7 Fair dealing relates to how a transaction was initiated, the
timing of the transaction, and how approvals of the action taken by
the board or shareholders were obtained. Fair price relates to the
"economic and financial considerations" of the proposed
transaction.' 49 An analysis of fair price is broad in scope, "including
all relevant factors."' 50
The independence of a board is extremely important if its
decisions are to survive entire fairness review. If a court determines
that a transaction was approved by a vote of independent directors or
shareholders, the decision will likely survive entire fairness scrutiny.'5'
144 See Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (1990)
(explaining the policy rationale for application of the entire fairness standard within
the factual context of merger transactions).
'45 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. A common scenario involving a controlling
shareholder and its fiduciary duty towards minority shareholders is the parent-
subsidiary relationship. In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971),
shareholders of a subsidiary alleged, inter alia, that the parent corporation was forcing
the subsidiary to pay out excessive dividends, causing corporate waste. Because the
parent corporation stood on both sides of the dividend transaction (it was a fiduciary
and also had a personal interest in maximizing the amount of dividends it received),
the court held the issuance of dividends amounted to "self-dealing" and applied the
entire fairness standard. "Self-dealing occurs when the parent, by virtue of its
domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent
receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the
minority stockholders of the subsidiary." Id. at 720.





5 SeeKahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) ("[A]n
approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed
majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness
from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-
plaintiff.").
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A court, however, will scrutinize whether the vote was truly
"independent."'52
C. Blasius/Schnell-Implicating Shareholder Voting Concerns
When the actions of a corporate board affect the shareholders'
right to vote, courts are likely to apply an intermediate level of
scrutiny-somewhere between business judgment and entire fairness.
The first Delaware case to address substantially shareholder voting
rights was Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.53 In that case, the Chris-
Craft board attempted to advance the date of a shareholder meeting
from a date set in the bylaws of the corporation to prevent a dissident
shareholder group from waging a proxy contesL' The court stated:
"In our view... management has attempted to utilize the corporate
machinery and the Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating
itself in office.... These are inequitable purposes, contrary to estab-
lished principles of corporate democracy." 5
Subsequent to Schnell, a number of decisions analyzed whether a
specific action taken by a board was "inequitable," and therefore
invalid.' 6 The next major doctrinal development came in Blasius
Industries v. Atlas Corp.'5 7 Blasius involved a hostile takeover attempt by
Blasius. After Atlas rejected a proposal by Blasius that called for a lev-
eraged restructuring, Blasius commenced a consent solicitation to
amend Atlas's bylaws and increase the size of the Atlas board, which
"1 Id. Delaware courts have accepted a two-prong test to determine whether an
"independent vote" is really "independent": "The mere existence of [independ-
ence] ... does not itself shift the burden .... First, the majority shareholder must not
dictate the terms of the merger. Second, the [independent party] must have real
bargaining power that it can exercise with the majority shareholder on an arms length
basis." Rabkin v. Olin Corp., 16 DEL J. CORP. L. 851, 861-62 (1990) (citations
omitted), affd, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990).
"' 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
4 See id at 439.
1"5 Id.
'- See, e.g., Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 13 DEL J. CoRp. L. 774, 792-94
(Del. Ch. 1987) (invalidating bylaw amendments intended to prevent the majority
stockholder from taking control of corporation); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421
A.2d 906, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980) (holding that the board's manipulation of by-laws
governing the annual shareholders' meeting was designed to prevent a dissident
group from participating in a proxy contest); Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d
140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (enjoining management's attempt to use corporate funds to
purchase stock to maintain its control of corporation).
157 564A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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would then be filled with Blasius nominees., 8  Atlas's board
responded by amending the bylaws to increase the size of the board,
but then filled the positions with its own representatives.'59 The Atlas
board conceded that the effect of its actions was to preclude the
Blasius group from gaining majority representation on the board.
60
The Delaware Chancery Court held that, although the Atlas board
had "acted in good faith"' 6' and in response to a valid "threat" by the
Blasius group,' 62 the board's actions violated the duty of loyalty it owed
to the shareholders.'s The court chose not to apply neither the busi-
ness judgment rule nor Unocal's standard of review, but applied a
form of closer scrutiny: "Action designed principally to interfere with
the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the
board and a shareholder majority.... [I] t may not be left to the
[board's] businessjudgment.
The court went on to develop what has come to be known as the
Blasius standard of review: "In ... cases dealing with... board acts
done for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stock-
holder voting power.., the board bears the heavy burden of demon-
strating a compelling justification for such action.
Though academics and practitioners have generally treated
Blasius as establishing a separate and distinct standard of review,'
Delaware courts have sought to construe Blasius as invoking a stan-
dard of review similar to UnocaL6 7 The courts have also emphasized
'. See id. at 654.
'59 See id. at 655.
0 See id. at 656.
161 Id. at 658.
162 Id.
'6 See id. at 663.
'6 Id. at 660.
'" Id. at 661.
'6 See, e.g., Andrew C. Houston, Blasius and the Democratic Paradigm in Corporate Law,
17 DEL J. CORP. L. 843, 855 (1992) (analyzing Blasius as promulgating a distinct
standard of review "drastically" altering the traditional approach taken by Delaware
courts, which have been loath to "adopt any limiting construction of directorial
powers"); Irwin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards ofJudicial Review of
Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 BUs. LAW. 647, 655 (Feb. 1992) (describing the
.compelling justification" test invoked under Blasius as "the Blasius inquiry" and
"separate from the Unocal proportionality standard"); Gregory S. Schaer, Comment,
Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.: Closer Scrutiny of Board Decisions Under the
"CompellingJustification" Standard, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 639, 641 (1991) ("[Elxploring
the scope and implication of this new standard ofjudicial review.").
167 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enter., 17 DEL J. CORP. L. 238, 253
(Del. Ch. 1991) ("Conceptually speaking, Blasius breaks no new ground .... ."); Stahl v.
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their desire not to promulgate per se rules regarding board action vis-
A-vis shareholders and that the standard of review utilized by the court
in Unocal or Blasius should not be determinative.1ss
IV. WHY UPREITS MAY REQUIRE GREATERJUDICIAL SCRUTINY
Because the UPREIT structure is unique, the application of a
standard of review is more complex than when a court is dealing with
a more typical corporate entity. Furthermore, because there has been
so little litigation involving UPREITs, there has been no real discus-. 169
sion of which standard is most appropriate. The only Maryland liti-
gation dealing with UPREITs in a takeover scenario was Chateau v.
MHC. 70 Although the Maryland District Court never handed down
Apple Bancorp, Inc., (Stahl II), [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,412, at 97,031, 97,036 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (comparing Unocal and Blasius and
stating that "these tests are structurally similar and may... be functionally similar as
well"); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., (Stahl I), 579 A.2d 1115, 1122 (Del. Ch. 1990)
("Blasius' reference to 'compelling justification' reflects only the high value that the
prior cases had placed upon the exercise of voting rights .... It [does not] represent
new law."); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286 (Del. Ch.
1989) ("[Under] Blasius, the 'heavy burden' imposed upon defendants was not a new
standard apart from UnocaL Rather, it was a specific expression of the proportionality
test as applied to conduct that effectively precluded the election of directors.").
"s See, e.g., Stahl II, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,036
("[G]hoice of a form ofjudicial review between [Unocal and Blasius] is probably not
decisive of anything."); Stahl I, 579 A.2d at 1125 ("[I]nquiries concerning fiduciary
duties are inherently particularized and contextual. It is probably not possible to work
out rules that will be perfectly predictive of future cases involving claimed
impediments to the shareholder vote."); see also Hubbard, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 257
("[T]he case-by-case development of the law governing fiduciary obligations [is] a
process that is integral to our common law tradition.").
1 The most recent case decided in Maryland involving REITs was analyzed under
the business judgment rule. See Realty Acquisition Corp. v. Property Trust of Am., No.
CIV.JH-89-2503, 1989 WL 214477, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 1989). Realty Acquisition
involved two REITs, not UPREITs, in a hostile takeover situation. The litigation
centered on Property Trust's adoption of a poison pill. The court reviewed the case
under the business judgment presumption as if the REITs were normal corporations:
"In Maryland... [t]he conduct of the corporation's affairs [is] placed in the hands of
the board of directors and if the majority of the board properly exercises its business
judgment, the directors are not ordinarily liable." Id. (quoting Mountain Manor
Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 461 A.2d 45, 51 (Md. Ct. App. 1983)). Neither this case nor
earlier Maryland cases dealing with REITs are helpful for our purposes, because the
basic REIT structure does not engender the potential conflicts of interest created by
the UPREIT structure. If these REIT cases reveal anything, it is that a court will apply
the business judgment presumption broadly, without taking into account (at least in
the written opinion) the specific nuances of the REIT/UPREIT structure.
170 See discussion supra Part II.E.1-2.
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any formal opinions on the litigation,' the court strongly hinted that
the ordinary business judgment standard of review should be applied
to UPREITs. Considering the numerous conflicts of interest that
the UPREIT structure engenders, however, this would very likely have
been the wrong standard of review to apply.
Based on the number of potential conflicts inherent in
UPREITs,17 3 a more rigorous standard of review may be more often
applicable to UPREITs than it would be to non-UPREIT corporations.
Yet, the conflicts found in an UPREIT only make a conflict of interest
situation more likely than it would be in a normal corporate structure.
As with any conflict, they are potential until they are catalyzed by a
specific transaction or decision.'74
Because it would be impossible to enact a specific standard of
review for UPREITs in every scenario, the problem arises as to when
the courts should apply a form of stricter scrutiny. Perhaps courts
should begin with a general conceptual analysis of why UPREITs may
require a stricter form of scrutiny than do other corporations. This
analysis would provide the foundation for a court to realize why a
standard stricter than business judgment may be applicable to
UPREITs more often than to typical corporations.
The following discussion examines a number of conceptual
reasons for applying a stricter form of scrutiny to UPREITs more fre-
quently than to typical corporations. There is no hard-and-fast
approach or rationale that will be equitable in every situation. Also, a
certain level of scrutiny should not be outcome-determinative,' 75
171 The lawsuit was eventually dropped by MHC. Seesupra note 103.
172 During a hearing on a motion for a temporary restraining order, the court
stated: "Then there is the matter of considering whether [MHC]'s claims are likely to
succeed on the merits. This hasn't been argued, but was in the papers with respect to
the businessjudgment rule, and I think that is a substantial factor that clearly supports
Chateau." Transcript From MHC's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Hearing
at 68, Chateau Properties, Inc. v. Manufactured Home Communities, Inc., No. WMN-
96-2930 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 1996).
"3 See discussion supra Part II.C-E.
'74 What separates UPREITs from normal corporations is the much greater
likelihood that conflicts of interest will occur. The basic structure of an UPREIT
places the interests of limited partners at odds with the interests of the shareholders in
numerous situations. See discussion supra Part II.C-E. This is not to say, however, that
such conflicts will arise in every UPREIT transaction.
'75 See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) ("[A]n
initial judicial determination that a given breach of a board's fiduciary duties has
rebutted the presumption of the business judgment rule.., is... not outcome-
determinative per set").
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though in practice it often is.176 In corporate litigation, the applica-
tion of entire fairness or Blasius-like review sends strong signals that
the decision of the board will face a difficult battle in court. In the
context of UPREITs, application of the business judgment rule would
bode well for the interests of the limited partners (especially when
these individuals sit on the board of the REIT),'" whereas stricter
standards of review would likely signal success for the common stock-
holders.
In a practical sense, the relevant question as to what standard of
review is most appropriate becomes a question of who the court
should favor-the limited partners (who were responsible for con-
tributing real estate to the UPREIT in order to realize personal tax
advantages) or the common shareholders. The answer to this
question is unclear and will vary, depending on the circumstances.
What is apparent, however, is that courts need to recognize the com-
plexities of the UPREIT structure and the greater likelihood that the
decisions of a REIT board will require more scrutiny and less defer-
ence than the businessjudgment rule dictates.
A. Policy Behind the Creation of RElTs and UPREITs
A court reviewing UPREIT litigation should first look at the
purposes that compelled Congress to create REITs and allow the evo-
lution of UPREITs. The tax laws which brought REITs into existence
were enacted as a means to get small, middle-class investors involved
in real estate investment.' 7 These laws, which govem a basic REIT
structure (not an UPREIT), have been kept substantially the same,
while the basic structure and use of the REIT has undergone radical
transformation 7  Although Congress may not have had the UPREIT
.. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del.
Ch. 1986) ("Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule
is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the
appropriate standard ofjudicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome of
[the] litigation.").
177 See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the prevalence of UP limited partners
being elected to the board of the related REIT).
"s See Haft & Fass, supra note 10, § 16.01, at 16-4 to -5 ("REITs were
authorized.., as a way for small investors to realize the financial benefits of real estate
investments, previously available only to institutions and wealthier individuals.");
McCarthy, supra note 41, at 14 ("REITs were created in 1960 by tax law changes to
encourage investor participation in real estate.").
17 While UPREITs have become the dominant form of REIT, the tax laws
governing REITs have not substantially changed to reflect this evolution. As discussed
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structure in mind when it passed laws allowing the basic REIT
structure in 1960, courts must still bear in mind Congress's intent in
creating the REIT structure and why it has not outlawed the UPREIT
structure-to create incentives through tax subsidies for small
investors to invest in real estate.18
With the congressional policy underlying REITs in mind, a court
should also take note of the types of individuals that make the con-
trolling decisions of the UPREIT. UPREITs are generally controlled
by "insiders"-limited partners in the UP who contributed their
property to the partnership.'8 ' These individuals originally joined the
UPREIT for tax advantages. But, as "insiders," they also owe a
fiduciary duty to the non-controlling shareholders. s2  It is fair to
assume that many of these individuals are experienced real estate
investors, not the small-time investors REIT legislation was enacted to
help. The fact that the sponsors had the knowledge and wherewithal
to form and organize the UPREIT, as well as the fact that they held
property in an individual capacity prior to forming the UPREIT,
supports this assumption.
The motivations behind these "insiders" in forming UPREITs
often lie in the various advantages that accrue to the insiders indi-
vidually, such as relieving themselves of personal liability and defer-
ring taxable gain. The motivations generally do not include aiding
the cause of small investors.18 The tax advantages sought by property
contributors are legitimate vis-A-vis the Tax Code, but they arise out of
the personal economic interests of the partners, not the fiduciary duty
these individuals owe the stockholders. The fact that these
individuals are in positions where they can make decisions that
further their individual economic interests should weigh heavily in a
supra Part II.B, UPREITs differ from basic REITs in several significant ways-allowing
investors essentially to circumvent the laws governing REITs. See, e.g., discussion supra
Part II.B.3 on avoiding the "5/50 Rule." Congress, however, as evidenced by its
inaction, has tacitly chosen to accept the UPREIT structure, at least for the time being.
"' See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
In most UPREITs, the limited partners sit on the board of the managing
partner REIT. Even when limited partners do not sit on the board, the limited
partners wield considerable power over the strategic direction and decisions made by
the REIT. See discussion supra Part II.C.
112 See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 1994) ("This
Court has held that 'a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority
interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.'" (emphasis
added) (quoting Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344
(Del. 1987))).
1 See discussion supra Parts II.B, III.B.
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court's consideration of whether the decisions of these individuals are
consistent with the policy reasons behind the passage of the original
REIT laws, and also with the fiduciary duties those individuals owe to
the other shareholders.
B. Formalistic Interpretation of the UPREIT Structure
In addition to the congressional policy reasons for creating
REITs, a court should also focus on the conceptual nature of the
UPREIT structure without getting too caught up in the complicated
Tax Code provisions. The core problem UPREITs pose concerns the
two different types of parties that vie for control of the UPREIT in a
merger or acquisition scenario. In simple terms, UPREITs involve
both a partnership (the UP) and a corporation (the publicly held
REIT which manages the UP).'" This structure is complicated by the
fact that the partners in the UP can convert their partnership interests
to common stock in the corporate REIT.'8 Thus, in the UPREIT
structure, a court is looking at two very different types of common
shareholders: the common shareholders who purchased stock in the
equity markets, and the common shareholders who received the stock
by converting their limited partnership interests.
This dichotomy can be analyzed in a purely formalistic manner:
Who owns the most stock? Whichever "type" of shareholder owns
more of the common stock should be entitled to more favorable
board decisions. If seventy percent of the common stock is owned by
individuals who converted their partnership interests, then one could
argue that the board's decisions should benefit these individuals-
presumably, transactions that would allow the one-time partners to
continue to defer the recognition of income on the properties they
contributed. By contrast, if seventy percent of the stock is owned by
individuals who simply purchased the stock in the open market in
hopes of dividends and share appreciation, the board's decisions
should reflect the wishes of these stockholders.
This approach is founded on the logical premise that, were every
business decision of an UPREIT put to a shareholder vote, the group
that owned the majority of the shares would always be able to put its
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part I.C.
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interests above those of the minority group. Such democratic princi-
ples underlie the foundations for all of corporate law.'
This formalistic approach is problematic, however, in that control-
ling shareholders still owe the minority a fiduciary duty.187 A control-
ling group of shareholders does not have the right to wield its power
in a manner that causes discriminatory effects among shareholders.'88
A court following a purely formalistic approach to analyzing the
UPREIT structure would be sanctioning such behavior. Although a
formalistic approach is useful in the sense that it forces a reviewer to
take a simplified overview of the UPREIT structure, it does not
provide sufficientjustification for a court to ignore the interests of the
minority shareholders.
C. Shareholder Expectations
Judicial review of UPREIT litigation could also take into account
the expectations of the two different types of UPREIT shareholders.
The individuals who are initially limited partners, before converting
their interests, presumably are well aware of the complex tax advan-
tages that the UPREIT structure gives them because these are usually
the individuals who organize and form the UPREIT. Assuming they
are aware of the tax advantages, they are also likely to be aware of the
potential conflict between their interests and the interests of the
common shareholders. In contrast, many of the common share-
holders who purchase their REIT shares in the open market are
probably not aware of the complexities of the UPREIT structure, at
least not to the extent the limited partners are.
One could argue that a shareholder should bear the risk when
she voluntarily makes an informed purchase of any investment
'" See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("The
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests.... [I]t is clear that [the shareholder vote] is critical to the
theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast
aggregations of property that they do not own.").
'8' However, the controlling shareholders must hold a majority of the shares. See
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (holding
that controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders).
"s See id.; Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975 (Del. 1977) ("It is a settled
rule of law in Delaware that.., the majority stockholder... owe[s] to the minority
stockholders of the corporation a fiduciary obligation in dealing with the latter's
property."); see also supra note 145 (discussing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717 (Del. 1971)).
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vehicle, even an exotic vehicle like an UPREIT.' This risk
assumption may be true with respect to the risk that the company will
underperform the market. However, the investor should not be
forced to assume the risk that the company's board will ignore the its
fiduciary duties or act against the shareholders' interests. Investors
purchasing shares in a REIT are entitled to the presumption that,
because they are shareholders, the directors representing their rights
as shareholders will be making decisions that are in the shareholders'
best interests.19°
In analyzing shareholder expectations, a court should also recog-
nize the effects of the limited partners becoming shareholders
through their convertible partnership interests.'9' This convertibility
feature has two effects in relation to the expectations of the other
shareholders. First, shareholders purchasing REIT shares in the
1An argument could be made that the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
("ECMH") mitigates the need to protect shareholders from the UPREIT's
complexities. The ECMH posits that efficient capital markets are those in which
"prices at any time 'fully reflect' all available information." Eugene Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). See
generally RoNALDJ. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 135-81 (1995) (explaining the underpinnings and limitations of the
ECMH through a survey of current academic articles). If this were the case, the
argument could be made that the risks inherent in the UPREIT are already
incorporated into the current market prices of UPREIT securities. Therefore, added
protection for shareholders through greater public disclosure or enhanced judicial
scrutiny would be unnecessary, or significantly less so, based on the fact that the
UPREIT's market values have already been adequately discounted for their added risk
to shareholders.
The basic premise of the ECMH, that prices reflect information, has generally
been accepted by both the economic and legal academic communities. See RonaldJ.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
549-56 (1984) (recognizing that the ECMH is "the context" for debating corporate and
securities law and policy). However, the extent to which markets are truly efficient has
been, and continues to be, a matter of heated debate. See generally Lawrence A.
Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 549 nn.8-9 (1994) (providing an
extensive list of academic articles that have challenged the validity of the ECMH). At
the very least, there is widespread empirical evidence that there are factors besides the
ECMH at work in the securities markets. See Leslie P. Norton, The Outliers: Refusing to
Run with the Herd Can Be Dangerous, but Can Pay Off BARRON'S, May 20, 1996, at 43
(recognizing that the ECMH has failed to explain a number of significant anomalies in
the stock market's behavior). In the case of UPREITs, their relatively recent
introduction into the securities and mergers and acquisitions markets, as well as to the
tenets of corporate law, cautions against depending entirely on the ECMH as a
protection for REIT shareholders. Pursuing the applicability of the ECMH to
UPREITs is beyond the scope of this Comment.
"o See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
' See discussion supra Part lI.C.
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market may not understand the shareholder composition of the
UPREIT. A shareholder would have no reason to expect that when
she purchases REIT shares she could be joining other REIT share-
holders who have conflicting economic interests. It would be
tremendously unfair to a shareholder if she were to buy into a REIT
controlled by individuals who were once limited partners in the UP
and who intend to manage the UPREIT to promote their individual
tax interests.
Second, there is the potential that limited partners can, on con-
version of their interests, transfer their personal tax liability to the
shareholders.' 2 Such a transaction was proposed in the Chateau v.
MHC battle, where the Chateau board recast a merger agreement to
allow the limited partners to convert their non-voting partnership
interests and pass on the partners' personal tax liability to the other
common shareholders of the merged entity.'9 3 Not only would this
transaction have saddled shareholders with an unexpected tax
liability, it would also have given the partners enough voting power to
ensure that they would have prevailed in any shareholder vote.' 4 In
Chateau, such a transaction would have allowed the insiders to defeat
the other shareholders in a vote to approve a stock-swap merger,
which benefited the insiders and to reject MHC's higher-value cash
tender offer, which was worth more to the common shareholders.9 5
The economic surprises a REIT board could impose on investors
should be an important factor in a court's analysis. The fact that the
UPREIT form makes these transactions possible should be a strong
reason for courts to scrutinize the decisions of an UPREIT, especially
in contexts similar to the Chateau v. MHC takeover contest.
D. Economic Interpretation of the UPREIT Structure
A court should also consider the potential economic effects of
ignoring the inherent conflicts of the UPREIT. Judicial opinions
which allow REIT boards to run roughshod over the interests of
192 See discussion supra Part II.E.
See discussion supra Part II.E.
,9 The limited partners' convertible interests could also deter shareholder action.
Shareholders who realize that the limited partners have the power to convert their
interests and become controlling shareholders might think twice before voting in a
way adverse to the interests of the limited partners. This deterrent effect is
exacerbated if shareholders realize the possibility of having to bear the personal tax
liabilities of the individual partners. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
195 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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common shareholders will make it difficult for UPREITs to attract
potential investors. This is dangerous because public offering
dollars are especially important to UPREITs. As the managing
partner of the UP, it is the REIT's role to contribute cash to the UP
during the initial formation phase. The limited partners initially con-
tribute real estate properties; however, future real estate acquisitions
require cash. This need for cash, in light of the primarily illiquid
assets of the UPREIT, necessitates the raising of capital, usually
through the public market. 97 Thus, the success of an UPREIT in the
equity markets and a good reputation among equity investors are vital
to its existence.198
V. EFFECT OF GREATERJUDICIAL SCRUTINY ONJUDICIAL REVIEW
If courts give UPREITs greater scrutiny without creating an
entirely separate doctrinal framework, they are left with the problem
of fitting this scrutiny within the confines of accepted corporate law
doctrines.' This would raise the obvious question of whether litiga-
tion involving UPREITs should automatically trigger stricter scrutiny.
The answer is "no." There is no need for a court to abandon the
burden-shifting and procedural guidance that the business judgment
'% See, e.g., Scherrer, supra note 46, at 42 ("Management's ability to meet
projections and avoid conflicts of interest with the REIT are critical to raising capital
and minimizing the cost of the capital.").
'97 See, e.g., id. at 44 ("Since REITs cannot retain capital for growth [because of the
95 percent dividend distribution requirement], they are forced to offer stock on the
public market or issue debt. Offering stock on the public market is the preferred
method for raising capital, since REIT success is based on leverage aversion."); Lipton,
supra note 25, at 832 ("Because the traditional sources of capital for real estate have
dried up, it has been necessary for real estate owners and developers to find alternative
capital .... One of the few potential sources for such capital is the public securities
markets. ...").
"a Some industry analysts predict that the conflicts of interest within the UPREIT
structure will harm UPREITs in the equity offering markets: "'The UPREIT structure
adds a level of complication to the corporate governance that, over the long run, will
prove a disadvantage .... A clean, simple ownership structure, with limited conflicts
[of interest], should achieve a pricing advantage over the more complicated
UPREITs.'" McCarthy, supra note 41, at 16 (quoting Rodney Dimock, Executive Vice
President Cornerstone Properties). But see Copulsky, supra note 103 ("In the past,
[e]ntrepreneurial REIT sponsors.., never viewed the process of going public in terms
of fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. REITs today have a much more corporate
view, and are much more sensitive to the interests of shareholders.").
'99 See discussion of Delaware's doctrinal approach to the business judgment rule
and entire fairness review, supra Part III.
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rule provides20 simply because an UPREIT is involved. It would be a
mistake, doctrinally and pragmatically, to urge the default application
of a certain standard of review solely because litigation involves an
UPREIT.
Delaware courts consistently have emphasized that corporate liti-
201gation is meant to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Standards of
review are neither meant to be outcome-determinative2 0 2 nor meant to
be applied on a per se basis to a specific type of corporate entity.20 In
a situation that does not involve a conflict, it would be doctrinally
incorrect for a court to apply a different standard of review just
because the entity involved is an UPREIT. A court should proceed
under the procedural framework that has evolved in the case law.24 If
a plaintiff alleging a breach of fiduciary duty cannot prove that a
215REIT board stands on both sides of a transaction, or that a board
has acted for the primary purpose of interfering with stockholder
voting rights,206 then the business judgment presumption should be
applied.
It is also impractical to urge the creation of an entirely separate
set of judicial doctrines specifically for UPREIT litigation. UPREITs,
although gaining in popularity, are still relatively rare when compared
207to the number of typical corporate entities. It would not be practi-
cable to call for an exclusive "UPREIT standard of review" when the
courts have not done so for other quasi-corporate entities such as S
corporations, limited liability corporations, and REITs.2 0 8 The
potential conflicts of the UPREIT also do not necessarily adversely
affect other shareholders' interests. 20 9 They may be irrelevant to the
20 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
20' See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
203 See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[O]ur
inability to foresee now all of the future settings in which a board might, in good faith,
paternalistically seek to thwart a shareholder vote, counsels against the adoption of a
perserule.").
2" See discussion supra Part III.
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("The requirement
of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a
transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the
test of careful scrutiny by the courts.").
2 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
2M See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2 (listing the number of registered RErrs at 210
with a market capitalization of $60.9 billion).
See supra Part III.C.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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litigation before the court, or they may not exist at all. 210 A court will
need to examine the facts within their context.
The fact that a case involves the decision of an UPREIT should
not change the fundamental application of accepted doctrine. What
should change is the court's attention to the specifics of the
transactions under review, due to the increased likelihood that a
REIT board's decisions may not have been in good faith with respect
to the shareholders who purchased their shares in the public market.
This is not to say that an UPREIT's decisions can never be made in
good faith; however, if insiders dominate the board and own the
majority of the REIT stock, there is a substantially greater likelihood
that the board is considering the interests of those insiders first, to the
detriment of the other shareholders the REIT structure was created to
help. A court should recognize, before applying the relevant doc-
trinal framework, that the UPREIT is a special type of corporation,
one that must be adequately understood, before the conflicts
involving the structure and its owners can be analyzed.
CONCLUSION
As UPREITs continue to grow in both property holdings and in-
vestor popularity, litigation concerning UPREITs and their various
equity holders will increase. Thus far, courts have shown a propensity
to treat these creatures as they would any other corporation--defer-
ring to the business judgment of fiduciaries unless the plaintiff
presents enough evidence to switch the burden and trigger height-
ened review. This default assumption concerning the similarity
between UPREITs and other corporations is conceptually unwar-
ranted, and is harmful to the interests of the common shareholders-
the individuals the law is in this area should be most concerned with
protecting.
210 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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